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Abstract: E-commerce transactions have a rapid development because of its convenience and flexibility. However, 
compared to the traditional market, the e-commerce transaction still could not get rid of information asymmetry between the 
online sellers and online buyers. Adverse selection problems brought by information asymmetry have negative impact on 
e-marketing and reduce the efficiency of the online transaction. Now some trading online platforms such as TAOBAO 
(http://www.taobao.com) are seeking ways to reduce adverse selection. Widely used approaches are credit scoring system 
and guarantee system. This paper takes transaction data from U disk market in TAOBAO as samples and analyzes the role of 
credit scoring system and guarantee system in Chinese e-commerce market. The results showed that the credit scoring 
system and guarantee system can effectively counteract negative effect from the adverse selection problems. Although the 
credit scoring system has a significant impact on transaction volume; guarantee system has greater impact on the trading 
volume than the credit scoring systems. In addition, relationship between the guarantee system and credit scoring system are 
not substitutes but complement for each other. In the case of the existence of the guarantee system, online consumers’ 
purchase for online goods options is still subject to the impact of the credit scoring system. The paper proposes strategy 
recommendations to improve credit scoring system and guarantee systems to promote the efficiency of online transactions. 
 
Keywords: credit scoring system, guarantee system, adverse selection 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Adverse selection means the selection by the consumer when faced with the circumstance of asymmetric 
information. Adverse selection theory was suggested by the American economist George Akerlof (1970), who is 
one of Nobel Economics Prize laureates in 2001. This theory initiated from ‘lemons’ problem (a colloquialism 
for defective cars in American), which was also known as ‘lemons market’ theory. With the adverse selection 
model, Akerlof indeed explains many economic institutions and many important aspects of uncertainty. Adverse 
selection theory illustrates the result of asymmetric information: adverse selection leads to decline of market 
efficiency and market economy is not sufficiently effective [1]. He has put forward and explained the approaches 
for eliminating the adverse selection problem. The Akerlof’s adverse selection theory studies the traditional 
markets (physical markets), but how about the cyber markets that are based on the Internet?  
Compared with the physical market, the advantage of e-commerce markets lies in its lower enter-obstacle, 
lower transaction cost and easily acquirement for the market information. But the adverse selection problem is 
then actually reinforced by Internet. The adverse selection problems resulting from asymmetry of quality 
information exist more seriously than in the physical market [2] [3]. Further, the information provided by suppliers 
pursuing a differentiation strategy rather deters the possibilities of comparing offers.  
In fact, Chinese consumers have stronger ‘‘lemon’s sensitivity’ than other developed countries. According to 
‘The 35th Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China’ released by the China Internet 
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Network Information Center (CNNIC) (2011) [4], the ratio of Chinese online consumer to encounter fraud is 
12.6%, the online shopping rate in China e-consumers was only 55.7% in 2014.In contrast, the online shopping 
rate in USA was as high as 71% in August 2006. These facts illustrate that there exist the adverse selection 
problems, which has seriously affected the development of the Chinese electronic commerce. 
Some trading platforms such as TAOBAO are seeking ways to reduce adverse selection, which is widely 
used approach to credit evaluation. This system of operating principle is: When buyers and sellers have 
completed a transaction, the buyer will make the evaluation to the seller's product quality and quality of service 
after getting the goods, the evaluation is displayed in the seller's shop in the form of scoring, future buyers 
purchasing goods buyers can check the seller's appraisal records by credit scoring systems. If the seller's credit 
record is good, more and more buyers will choose to transact with it; if the evaluation is not good, the buyers 
will interrupt the transaction. This can motivate businesses to take account of long-term interest of maintaining 
good credit history.The guarantee system is actually a deposit system. If the seller participated in a guarantee 
system and the merchandise are out of the corresponding problem, buyers can spend seller guarantees in 
advance, so that the interests of buyers can get maximum protection. For buyers have participated guarantee 
system ,if the seller offers a low-quality product or receivable is not shipped, consumers will initiate complaints 
against trading platform providers such as TAOBAO and make payment requirements. If the seller is confirmed 
violations, the platform will be entitled to give the seller the appropriate punishment. Because of this guarantee 
system is more severe punitive measures, it making the fraudulent sellers have to pay more dearly. Once the 
seller have participated guarantee systems, they will be no incentive to deceive consumers. 
The focus of this paper is: In Chinese e-commerce market, guarantee system is more effective than the 
credit rating system? Credit scoring system still has a significant effect on transaction under the guarantee 
system? How to improve the two systems? There is an alternative or complementary one? How to improve the 
utility of these two systems? 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The earliest use of the credit rating system is a famous site eBay in USA. The design and effectiveness of 
online transactions credit system has been the focus of many scholars. Ba and Pavlou have proved that the 
seller's credit score can effectively reduce the network market information asymmetry [5]. Dewally and 
Ederington find that businesses credit score has a significant positive impact on commodity prices, while 
negative feedback will result in the seller Recently lower commodity pricing [6]. Jie collected transaction records 
about iPod on the eBay auction and have reached similar conclusions using regression analysis methods [7]. 
Levin draw the conclusion that seller's credit has significant enhance on the auction prices and the negative 
feedback has negative impact on the transaction price [8].Mikhail and Aim then improved auction model for eBay 
coins prices further and got the same results [9]. Zhou and Zhang found that the credit scoring system has a 
significantly positive effect evaluation on credit transaction prices and auction success probability, credit 
evaluation on trading volume (probability) and prices have a positive role in promoting [10]. 
Although most of the empirical research show that the seller's credit score has a significant positive effect 
on the transaction price and transaction probability, but there are still some economists’ doubt about its 
effectiveness and it cannot prevent fraud and online transactions effectively. Resnick have analyzed the credit 
scoring system of eBay and found that the accumulation of the seller's poor record have an impact on the future. 
So the seller has incentive to use credit scoring system for speculation and fraud [11]. Resnick and Zeckanser 
found that the credibility of the evaluation results will be greatly reduced because the online subject is not 
identifiable and the credit scoring system cannot be supervised [12]. Wooders believes that online sellers with 
well credit score may not provide a high quality product or service because of the credit scoring system has 
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certain distortion [13]. Pan has made an empirical study of credit scoring system from TAOBAO and found that 
the credit scoring system can play an important role to reduce the adverse selection phenomenon of lacking 
credit network market, but the distortion of Web information issuance will reduce the effect of credit scoring 
system [14]. 
Because of these problems of credit scoring system, some scholars begin to study trust guarantee system. 
Koreto verified that the third-party guarantee services can significantly increase the consumer's purchase 
intention with the mathematical model [15]. Lee put out that the introduction of third-party guarantee system can 
effectively reduce the asymmetric information in network [16]. Dewally has validated the conclusion by using 
eBay data [17]. Heezena and Baetsbyc analyzed guarantee system of the network platform in Holland's online 
flower market [18]. Choi, Stah and Whinston believe that short-term contract in the Internet exchange market can 
guarantee the integrity management [19]. Changsu makes the summary on the evolutionary way for Internet 
shopping platform and believed that the guarantee system is effective to solve the problem of information 
asymmetry [20]. Pan have taken the network reputation as a guarantee system and established a reputation model 
using the principle of information economics [21]. Chen believes that the certification as a guarantee system can 
reduce the generated fraud [22].Zhou and Lu questionnaire for the role of third party trust system and consider the 
supervision and guarantee measures have important effect [23].  
This paper will be based on the local characteristics and study how to offset negative impact from adverse 
selection problems in Chinese e-commerce market. The paper will be based on evidence of TAOBAO and 
comparatively analyze credit scoring system and guarantee system.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: BASED ON THE DATA FROM TAOBAO 
3.1 TAOBAO credit scoring system and guarantee system 
TAOBAO (http://www.Taobao.com) was founded in 2003 by Alibaba Company. TAOBAO has exceeded 
eBay and become China's largest C2C online trading platform in 2005. In order to reduce the negative effect of 
adverse selection of virtual transactions, TAOBAO has established a set of credit scoring system, records each 
user’s evaluation acquired in the past transactions, these evaluations has been changed into a total reputation 
score in a certain way. Compared with eBay, TAOBAO designs the credit scoring system that is different from 
the eBay:  
• The method of pricing is one-time price instead of bidding. The credit evaluation got by the seller and 
the buyer has calculated separately. On each month, the evaluation score between buyers and sellers are less 
than 6 point. The evaluation beyond the scope will not score.  
• Evaluation system is dynamic. After successful transactions in the TAOBAO online buyers, buyers can 
evaluate the seller with four indicators (whether conform to, baby and describe the attitude of the seller, the 
seller's delivery speed and logistics Services Company), evaluation is divided in 1-5. 
• Avoid retaliatory bad evaluation. Buyers can evaluation after purchase, but evaluations are published 
after the mutual evaluations are finished in order to avoid revenge. 
But the TAOBAO found some problems, such as a large number of online credit speculation phenomenon. 
Some malicious counterfeiters (credit-brusher) take ‘fake sales’ to get good credit score. Although the TAOBAO 
uses some severe blow to this kind of behavior, the credit the phenomenon still exists. The main reason is that 
this credit-brusher simulates real transaction which is difficult to be detected. In addition, there are some 
distortion behavior such as behavior of malicious evaluation and credit manipulation. Therefore, credit scoring 
system is difficult to curb Internet fraud effectively. In this case the guarantee systems emerge. TAOBAO 
pushed out guarantee system based on the ‘consumer protection plan’ in 2007 and encourage qualified buyers to 
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join the system. In the guarantee system the sellers can choose faith deposit to pay a certain amount to the 
TAOBAO. If the product quality problems arise in after the success of the transaction within 14 days, buyers 
can initiate payment application in advance from TAOBAO. If buyers suffered disputes or losses and the seller 
refused to pay, TAOBAO will use the deposit stored in the TAOBAO from the seller to pay the buyer. 
3.2 The data and explanatory variable 
This paper selects U disk (model: DT101 8G) from TAOBAO as the research object, use data capture 
program provided by TAOBAO server to get relevant data 1242 entries. The research object of this paper is 
mainly the influence of credit scoring system and guarantee system for network transaction efficiency, so the 
explanatory variable is the volume of transactions recently 30 days (sales). Explanatory variables are credit 
evaluation index and guarantee system index. Credit evaluation index include seller credit score (score) and the 
seller received rate (ratio). 
The guarantee system is set as a dummy variable index. We use five indicators from TAOBAO’s guarantee 
system as explanatory variables: D1 presents whether or not to join the ‘consumer protection service’, D2 
presents whether or not to join the ‘seven days to return’ service, D3 presents whether or not to support the 
‘false one compensate three’, D4 presents whether or not to join ‘24 hours delivery’, D5 presents whether or not 
to join ‘30 days to repair’. Price appears in the model as a control variable.  
 
Table 1.  Variable definition 
Type Name Meaning The expected sign 
The dependent variable sales volume of transactions in 30 days  
 
 
 
Variables 
score seller’s credit + 
price commodity prices - 
ratio praise rate of seller + 
D1 consumer protection service + 
D2 seven days to return + 
D3 false one compensate three + 
D4 24 hours delivery + 
D5 30 days to repair + 
                              
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics of U disk (N=762) 
 The average Median maximum value minimum value Standard deviation 
sales 2.36 0 275 0 13.21 
score 302 219 92456 0 793.87 
ratio 92.90% 100% 100% 0% 16.86% 
price 47.54 46 54 43 3.62 
D1 0.5467 1 1 0 0.51 
D2 0.2746 0 1 0 0.46 
D3 0.0069 0 1 0 0.08 
D4 0.0472 0 1 0 0.22 
D5 0.0568 0 1 0 0.25 
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3.3 Model  
The specific model is as follows: 
    εβββββββββ +++++++++++=+ 54321)1()1ln()ln()1ln( 876543210 DDDDDratiolmscorepricesales  （1） 
Among them, D1-D5 is a dummy variable. Sales, score, ratio and price are taken the natural logarithm 
form. Because the sample variables have different, the logarithm is designed to eliminate the heteroscedasticity 
that may exist in regression. Because most logarithm value of the observations is less than 0, therefore the 
variables are plus 1 and then take the natural logarithm. 
This paper uses the Tobit model to ensure the consistency and unbiased estimation. Specific form as 
follows: 
εββββββ ++++++++++=+ ∗∗ )1ln(2)1ln(1)1ln()1ln()ln()1ln( 543210 scoreDscoreDratioscorepricesales （2） 
3.4 Data analysis 
According to the discussion above, we have designed a credit score on sales, the guarantee system of effect 
on sales, two kinds of trust system on sales and the effects of interaction between two systems. The price in each 
model is control variables. The four models under the Eviews5.0 operation results are summarized as follows:   
 
Table 3.  Analysis results 
 Variables ln( 1)sales +  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 
ln( )price  -5.79*** -5.62*** -5.54*** -5.37*** 
ln(1 )score+  0.18*** — 0.14*** 0.28** 
ln(1 )ratio+  0.12* — 0.11* 0.07 
D1 — 1.22*** 0.35** 0.29** 
D2 — 0.98*** 0.37*** 0.31** 
D3 — -0.63 -0.43 — 
D4 — 0.23* 0.16 — 
D5 — 0.36 0.21* — 
D1* ln(1 )score+  — — — -0.05 
D2* ln(1 )score+  — — — -0.22** 
C 38.61*** 42.53*** 36.75*** 35.93*** 
2R  0.58 0.74 0.86 0.85 
Hierarchical  F-test   20.35*** 24.52*** 
Durbin-Watson stat   1. 81 1.87 
（ *、**、*** are expressed in 10%, 5% and 1% significance level） 
From this analysis we can found: 
• Prices in the four models of on the impact of explanatory variables are significant and the coefficient is 
negative. It indicates that the higher the price of goods more difficult to sell. Because the buyer fails to identify 
the quality, only the high quality goods receiving low price -- this is characteristics of adverse selection. The 
results show that online consumers’ first value is the price of commodity in Chinese e-commerce market. The 
results also indicate that Chinese online consumers is more sensitive to price.  
• Credit evaluation in this model is also significantly affects on the explained variable even in the presence 
of guarantee system. This shows that credit scoring system can weaken the negative effect of adverse selection 
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on TAOBAO. This result also reflects the defects of credit scoring system: when the seller's credit score is high 
enough, the seller still may engage in fraud because little review does not significantly influence the positive 
score. This situation will lead to fuzzy evaluation and lose their effectiveness. On the other hand, it also results 
in one-sided pursuit of credit points from sellers. 
• The guarantee system of variables D1 and D2 had a significant effect on sales. The results show that, 
‘the consumer protection service’and‘returned 7 days service’in several models have significant influence on 
the sales of goods. It also indicate that the sellers who have joined‘the consumer protection service’and
‘returned 7 days service’can reduce the risk of online shopping. 
• The guarantee system of the variables D3 and D4 had a small significant effect on sales. The reason of 
the effect is: sellers to join the security services is few, the use of this service businesses is less than 1%. In 
addition, if the buyers buy fake and appeal to TAOBAO, this system requires many businesses to provide 
products and expected costs is higher. The service guarantees such as the 24 hour delivery and 30 days of repair 
is not significant, which mainly due to buyers’ focus on the quality of the goods first. Also the 24 hours delivery 
this guarantee service has some alternative, dynamic evaluation system has few significant roles. 
• We compare the effect of credit scoring system and guarantee system on trading volume. By calculation 
we found: when the credit score increase from the 302 to 604, seller only sale more than 1.2 U disks in 30 days; 
Sellers joined the consumer protection plan can sell more 4.8 U disk than not to join the 30 day; Sellers joined 
the 7 days return plan can sell more 4.8 U disk than not to join the 30 day. Through the above analysis, we can 
conclude that although credit score has significant influence on trading volume, guarantee service greater impact 
on trading volume than the credit score. 
• The correlation between credit scoring system and guarantee system. By the model results, the 
D1* ln(1 )score+ coefficient is negative but not significant, it indicating that whether the seller join the 
consumer protection service, credit evaluation has impact on trading volume and there is little difference 
significant. Even if sellers joined the consumer protection service, credit evaluation still has remarkable effect 
on the trading volume, also that buyers pay more attention to credit scoring. D2* ln(1 )score+ coefficient is 
negative and more significantly, it shows that comparing with adding 7 days return service buyers, credit scoring 
effect on the trading volume has less significantly than that not to join the service. In addition, the F test results 
show that: the sum of three variable coefficient ln(1 )score+ , D1* ln(1 )score+ , D2* ln(1 )score+  (t = 0.10) 
are no significant difference from zero. It shows that credit scoring system have no significant impact on trading 
volume for the sellers joined the seven day return service. Buyers don’t need to take the credit score system as a 
reference. 
The above results also tell us, credit evaluation system and guarantee system has a complementary 
relationship. For the sellers joined consumer protection services credit evaluation for buyers still has a 
significant positive effect. So the consumer protection service cannot completely replace the credit evaluation 
function. By the 80 online sellers random sampling from TAOBAO and credit evaluation record in 30 days , we 
found that nearly 15% sellers have received negative feedback in the comments. The complaint is small flaws or 
service. If the buyer request compensation, they must collect relevant evidence such as the seller chats, the 
pictures of goods, according to the consumer protection service process. It will spend some time and energy. 
Online buyers have to wait for about 30 days before applying for reimbursement success. If some quality 
problems are not too serious, online buyers may not apply for compensation because of the high cost and may 
choose to give bad scoring or comment to warn the seller, which still needs credit scoring system to compensate 
for the loss. 
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4. CONCLUSION  
Through the empirical analysis, we can find that the credit scoring system and guarantee system are 
conducive to reduce negative effects brought by the adverse selection. While credit scoring system has 
significant influence on transaction volume, the influence of guarantee system on trading volume was much 
higher than that of credit scoring system. But guarantee system cannot completely replace the credit evaluation 
function, it is a complementary relationship. In the presence of guarantee system, consumers are still subject to 
credit scoring system. 
In order to make better use of these two kinds of systems counteract the adverse selection, following aspects 
should be improved:  
• The threshold of the seller for guarantee system should be reduced. We should improve the cognitive on 
the guarantee system and simplify application process for sellers to join guarantee system. New seller should be 
equal to get competition opportunity with the old seller under the guarantee system. 
• Since credit evaluation system and guarantee system has a complementary relationship, forced credit 
score rule or automatically processing system should be canceled when the buyer does not score. We should 
allow the buyer make voluntary score after completion of the transaction.  
• Credit scoring system need to be improved and revised to promote guarantee system operates better. 
Although TAOBAO's information-gathering and transmission of credit scoring system is carried out by the 
auto-complete, this information is made by the traders of their own. It will cause the ‘speculation’ of credit with 
false transactions, or buyers and sellers flatter or even revenge each other. Therefore, to prevent the seller using 
false transactions to ‘speculate’ credit is very important. We are pleased to see that TAOBAO has recognized 
this problem and take relevant measures, such as stipulating evaluation points between buyers and sellers not 
more than 6 points each natural months, adopting the real-name and increase punishment (or even the 
concealing ID) and other measures. But the effect is still not ideal. With the e-commerce policy and regulations 
gradually become clear and mature, we will counteract negative effect of adverse selection in Chinese 
e-commerce market for more options. 
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